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Determinants of share price movements in emerging equity markets: some evidence from 
America's past 
Peter Z. Grossman 
Abstract  
Emerging equity markets are plagued by poor information, which is a barrier to outside 
shareholder participation. This paper examines the determinants of share prices of two 
United States companies over a 14-year period during the late 19th century, when America 
had an emerging equity market. These two companies withheld all information on profits 
and assets until the end of the period, yet traded regularly. Overall, the evidence suggests 
that outside investors received sufficient compensation for their ignorance, and that these 
outsiders set the market price. An event study shows that when information about company 
assets was revealed, market returns were significantly changed. Emerging equity markets 
are plagued by poor information, which is a barrier to outside shareholder participation. This 
paper examines the determinants of share prices of two United States companies over a 14-
year period during the late 19th century, when America had an emerging equity market. 
These two companies withheld all information on profits and assets until the end of the 
period, yet traded regularly. Overall, the evidence suggests that outside investors received 
sufficient compensation for their ignorance, and that these outsiders set the market price. 
An event study shows that when information about company assets was revealed, market 
returns were significantly changed. 
Introduction  
Limited, unreliable information is often cited as a major stumbling block to investment in 
emerging equity markets (Chuhan, 1992; Bekaert, 1995). Short run, unreliable information 
can lead to fraud with outside investors as the losers. In the longer term, if public 
information remains poor, it would seem likely that insider information and behavior would 
drive prices. Any other scenario raises the question: how would ill-informed outsiders price 
shares where the risk-adjusted present value of the return on those shares is mainly 
guesswork?  
The question is difficult to answer with respect to contemporary emerging markets precisely 
because information is unreliable or unavailable. But archival data can provide a perspective 
on the behavior of past emerging equity markets. The United States in the 19th century was 
an example of such a market,( n1) one that was notoriously plagued by poor information. 
Baskin (1988), for example, notes that accounting data were often "nonexistent or entirely 
unreliable" (p. 200). Yet with archival records, we can learn a great deal about the actual 
assets and cash flows of companies and can observe that information with respect to share 
price movements over time.  
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In this paper, I examine the share price behavior of two companies, the Adams Express and 
the American Express, from 1885 to 1898. This is admittedly a small sample, but these two 
companies (that still exist and trade) had a special distinction: at the start of the period (and 
for more than a decade previously), they released no public information about earnings and 
assets. Other firms, such as railroads, did make information on earnings and assets regularly 
available;( n2) it is uncertain just how seriously investors considered published data. For the 
two express firms, the revenues and profits of which it is now clear equaled those of major 
railroads (Grossman, 1996), there was virtually nothing to cloud the issue of information 
reliability; it simply was not available. Moreover, the express provides an interesting test of 
the importance of information. In 1898, state laws forced Adams Express to reveal publicly 
the size of its assets. It is hypothesized that this event should have had little effect if all 
information -- including that available only to insiders -- had already been accounted for in 
the stock price.  
Essentially, I will show in this paper: ( 1) that share price movements were systematically 
related to general movements in appropriate markets; ( 2) that market prices before the 
1898 event did not contain all information known to insiders as well as outsiders; ( 3) that 
outside investors, who generally set the market price, demanded a substantial premium, 
probably because they did not have all relevant information; and ( 4) that the 1898 event, 
which had no real effect on company cash flows, did notably alter share prices and investor 
returns.  
After a brief description of the two express firms and an explanation of how they controlled 
information, this paper tests for systematic influences and the importance of the 1898 
revelation of asset information. For the latter, an event study was run. The results raised 
several issues including that of efficiency in emerging markets. These issues are discussed in 
a concluding section.  
Control of information  
As explained in Grossman (1996), Adams and American express companies were the leading 
firms in the 19th century railroad express industry that controlled the parcel post system of 
the United States.( n3) The private express service leased space on railroad cars to provide 
rapid transport and delivery lot all packages not suitable as bulk freight. Because the express 
insured the value of the contents it carried, the service specialized in the transport of money 
and high-valued items. For most of its history the express was dominated by a five-firm 
cartel, which carried over 80% of all traffic (Grossman, 1996).( n4) Adams and American were 
the two largest firms, with almost half of all express traffic between them.  
Adams and American both had an unusual form of legal organization. They were 
unincorporated joint stock companies chartered under the laws of New York State 
(Grossman, 1992), which meant that they could sell stock, but that the shares carried 
unlimited liability.( n5) The directors of the firms accepted liability because the statutes 
governing unincorporated businesses provided express firms with certain advantages. 
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Above all, firms had few legal reporting requirements. Specific information about these 
companies was, thus, very limited. When the New York Stock Exchange tried to extract 
earnings information from American Express in 1876, the firm refused to provide it and 
replied that a listing on the NYSE was a matter of "indifference to us."( n6) The NYSE 
declined to pursue the matter further and the stock remained listed.  
It is important to understand how completely the express firms withheld information. 
During the period of this study, they never published annual reports or held shareholder 
meetings. There is evidence to suggest that even some insiders, including members of 
boards of directors, had less than complete information on the earnings and assets of their 
firms.( n7) Yet shares of American Express and Adams traded regularly on the New York 
Stock Exchange and were dispersed among a large number of owners. Bid and asked prices 
were published daily, trades occurred at least a few times per week,( n8) and there does not 
ever seem to have been a problem for the market to arrive at a tradable price.( n9)  
The express companies could be somewhat "indifferent" toward the secondary market in 
shares partly because they never sought financing either through debt or equity in the 
primary markets during this period. After 1868, the companies were entirely self- and bank-
financed. It should be noted that their indifference to the market notwithstanding, the 
companies rigorously maintained their dividends, suggesting that directors wanted to limit 
the volatility of prices in the secondary market. But the freedom from the primary market 
undoubtedly contributed to the limits on public information.  
Because of these limits, shareholders did not appreciate the underlying asset values of the 
shares. But because values were great, real returns to investors on these shares throughout 
the entire last quarter of the 19th century were very large, greater than those on railroad 
bonds, which Snowden (1990) showed to be, in general, the best investment of the late 19th 
century (Fig. 1). Snowden argued that high bond returns were unanticipated because of 
deflationary factors. These factors impacted express returns as well. But part of the high 
return on express shares seems to reflect compensation for risk -- risk that may have 
seemed great because shares were not backed by collateral and because of the dearth of 
reliable information about each firm's prospects. It will be shown later in this article how this 
risk premium changed as information improved.  
Public information on the express  
Despite the blackout on key details of the companies' size and performance, the public 
knew some facts about Adams and American. Four types of information would appear 
potentially to have had an impact on stock prices.  
3.1. Industry growth  
Investors could see expansion in the industry that could be at least partly quantified. The 
growing numbers of agencies and offices were highly visible. The size of traffic was not 
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specifically reported anywhere before 1890, but even before that time, any businessperson 
could discern that express traffic was expanding rapidly. For example, by the 1880s, 
between New York and Chicago, there were "all-express" trains; twenty years earlier, the 
express ran one car, or only part of a car, attached to a passenger train.  
In 1890, the size of the business became clearer when the express agreed for the first time 
to provide information to the US Census. Although express firms gave no information on 
earnings or revenues, and no useful information on assets,( n10) they revealed an annual 
package volume of over 115 million items and operations over 174,535 miles of railroad, 
steamship and stagecoach lines. To an investor, it must have been apparent that the 
industry was growing along with the American economy.  
3.2. Dividends  
Both firms paid dividends each year and thus they could have been perceived as bond 
substitutes. From 1869, the year that both firms were rechartered in the form they retained 
throughout the 19th century, both American and Adams never omitted a dividend payment 
in any year. In the case of Adams, it paid $8 per share per year without fail. This payout was 
not cut even during severe depressionary periods in the mid-1870s and 1890s. At the same 
time, the dividend was not increased in the booming 1880s.  
Meanwhile, American Express declared a $6 per share annual dividend in 1869. This was cut 
to $3 during a depression year, 1877, and was then raised incrementally back to $6 by late 
1881. The $6 dividend was retained for the rest of the century. Thus, during the period under 
study, shares of American, as well as Adams, may have been purchased as bond substitutes.  
3.3. Ties to the railroad industry  
Express companies were closely tied in the public mind to the railroads upon whom the 
express service depended. It was not generally the case that railroads controlled express 
companies.( n11) Still, express companies were identified as part of the larger transportation 
system, and the prospects for the railroads could have been seen as a reflection of the 
prospects for the express. Because many railroad and other transport company 
fundamentals were published and the fortunes of railroads were in the public eye, investors 
could have used that information to deduce the prospects for the express. Thus price 
movements in express shares could well have followed the movements in the prices of 
railroad shares.  
3.4. Industry news  
Express firms, individually and as an industry, also faced various publicly reported firm-
specific, as well as industry-wide, events --both positive and negative. Entry attempts, for 
example, were well known, although in the period under study only the railroads themselves 
ever tried to enter the express, and they did so only rarely (Grossman, 1996).( n12) Still, 
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conflict with railroad entrants meant lost business by one or more carriers. Cartel firms also 
sometimes engaged railroad entrants in price wars when there were alternative routes 
between cities.( n13) Most entries were ultimately unsuccessful and firms exited, news 
which in itself could have had an unanticipated positive impact on express share prices.  
There were also dividend changes. Although neither Adams nor American altered their 
dividends from 1885 through the end of the century, other firms in the industry did cut or 
raise payouts. The smaller United States Express, for example, cut its dividend three times, 
and raised it twice, between 1889 and 1895. It may be assumed that investor perceptions 
could have been affected by any dividend changes in the industry. These changes, which 
provided an indicator about the state of the industry as a whole, could have altered earnings 
expectations and raised questions about whether dividends for Adams and American would 
be cut, or raised, in the future.  
This information, although far from complete, might nonetheless have provided investors 
with sufficient data to establish a price of, and make a market in, the shares of the Adams 
and American express companies. Each of these factors was tested.  
Information and stock price movements: a test  
What specific information was related to price movements in express stocks? Share price 
movements of Adams and American were tested against variables that were known or at 
least generally discernible to examine systematic influences on express share prices. Toward 
that end, price changes between 1885 and 1896 were regressed against variables that 
captured the kind of public information noted in the previous section.  
The period 1897 through 1898 was examined separately. On February 10, 1898, Adams 
announced it would issue 4% bonds equal to 100% of the par value of its stock and would 
distribute the bonds to shareholders. This dividend resulted from asset-reporting 
requirements imposed specifically on Adams by several state statutes.( n14) For the first 
time, outside shareholders learned the true size of Adams's assets. It also might have been 
assumed that if Adams had concealed information concerning its assets so too did the other 
express firms. Overall, then, from February 1898 onward, it may be assumed investors in all 
express shares were better informed than they had been in previous years. This event 
permitted a test of the impact of important new information. An event study was run for 
both Adams and American on data surrounding this information revelation.  
For the first test, percentage changes in the monthly average price of shares in Adams and 
American express companies were regressed against monthly percentage changes in three 
specific variables that might have affected investors' perceptions of the prospects for the 
express firms: the average of daily bank clearances outside New York City, the yield on high 
quality railroad bonds, and the movements of a contemporaneous transportation stock 
index, the Dow 12. I also examine the effects of negative and positive publicly reported news 
events.  
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The complete equation is given by:  
( 1) Delta PRICE = Alpha + Beta1Delta BANK-1 + Beta2 Delta BOND + Beta3 Delta DOW + 
Beta4NEGNEWS + Beta5 POSNEWS  
The first independent variable, bank clearances outside New York (Delta BANK-1), would 
measure how responsive express share prices were to the changes in the economy overall. 
As commerce expanded, so too did transport, and indeed express revenues so far as they 
can be ascertained through archival records did rise over the long term in concert with the 
US economy. Therefore, the first variable tests whether investors, denied information on 
the fundamentals of the companies, considered instead the fundamentals of the country as 
a whole as their guide to the prospects for express firms, and used the pace and direction of 
economic growth to influence changes in express share prices.  
Bank clearances outside New York provided a coincident indicator of changes in the 
economy that had a high correlation with later GDP series (Macaulay, 1938), and unlike GDP 
numbers, bank clearances were readily observed at the time. Indeed, the series (from 
Moore, 1961) was taken directly from contemporaneous data that was published in The 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, and so would have been available to late 19th century 
investors. By excluding New York, a large quantity of purely financial transactions were 
removed from the measure. The test used a seasonally adjusted monthly average (Moore, 
1961) because some seasonal variation, which would have been discounted by investors, 
could distort a statistical test. Also, because the stock market is a forward-looking indicator 
whereas clearances are a coincident measure, the series was lagged one month. Changes in 
clearances should, of course, be positively related to changes in express share prices.  
Interest rates could also have been a determinant of changes in express share prices. 
Dividends gave some indirect indication of earnings as well as a definite, measurable return. 
Moreover, dividends were of considerable importance to 19th century investors, who often 
appear to have sought shares that were close substitutes for bonds (Graham and Dodd, 
1940; Baskin, 1988). Although each express firm's dividend tended not to rise above a 
certain level, if earnings were poor, dividends could have been cut or eliminated entirely. 
Consistent dividends would have signaled a history of earnings at least able to support that 
payout and, if maintained through both good and bad economic times, the stock could 
reliably have been thought to have had a stable, debt-like return. Further, the greater the 
reliability of the dividend, the lower the risk that either equity market fluctuations or 
published firm- and industry-specific news would have led to a dividend reduction. However, 
if the shares were considered bond-like, interest rate changes would likely have negatively 
affected express share prices. For this test, share price changes were regressed against 
changes in the bond rate (Delta BOND). The rate series used in the test was based on the 
yield of an index of high-quality railroad bonds that would have been-well known to 
investors of the day (Macaulay, 1938).  
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It might be wondered why railroad bonds were used instead of risk-free US government 
securities. The basic reason is given by Macaulay (1938) in his classic work on the historical 
movement of US interest rates. The yields on treasury securities were, according to 
Macaulay, distorted by banking rules that affected the "circulation privileges" of the bonds. 
He explicitly ruled them out as a benchmark for 19th century interest rate movements (p. 
74). High quality railroad bonds, which traded in a much larger and more active market than 
that of government securities, was the preferred indicator of fluctuations in market interest 
rates.  
The linkage of express stock prices to share price movements in the market for 
transportation stocks generally was tested against monthly changes in the Dow Jones 12 
stock index (Delta DOW). The index began in 1885, hence the choice of starting date for this 
survey. This index was especially appropriate to test against express firms because it was 
largely a portfolio of transport stocks, made up of ten railroads, a steamship company, and 
Western Union.( n15) Thus, in the Dow 12, there existed a representative transportation-
based stock market indicator that would have been directly observed by investors.  
The index began to be published in February 1885. Then, after May 1896, the Dow was 
divided into separate industrial and rail indices, and thus the first set of regressions is run for 
the entire life span of the Dow 12, which was published regularly in the Wall Street Journal. 
The period of the Dow 12 was sufficiently large to provide evidence of the relationship of a 
market indicator to the movement of express stocks.  
There was a statistical problem in using the Dow 12. Movements in it and in the bond market 
were fairly strongly correlated. For changes in these series, the correlation coefficient was -
0.5831, indicating possible collinearity in the regression results.( n16) Further analysis 
suggests that collinearity did not negate the results, although some caution must be 
maintained in any conclusions.( n17)  
Publicly reported events related to each firm and to the express industry as a whole might 
also have affected investors' perceptions of an individual firm's risks. Even for a company 
perceived to have been bond-like, negative and positive publicity might have affected the 
issue's implicit "rating" thus raising or lowering the risk premium investors would have 
demanded. The response of the share prices to these news reports would also demonstrate 
the importance of the public information that shareholders did receive.  
The reports, taken from contemporary news accounts, were treated in the test as separate 
dummy variables (NEGNEWS, POSNEWS), the first, testing the effect of negative public 
reports, the latter positive ones. Negative reports, of which fifteen examples were 
identified, consisted of: lowered dividends by both the United States Express Company and 
Wells Fargo; and three notable entry attempts by railroads (two in 1886), as well as a periods 
of price cutting that resulted largely from the railroad entry attempts (see Appendix). This 
study placed each event in the month when it was noted in public records. It is, of course, 
possible that some investors (perhaps the most important investors) could have had the 
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information earlier, perhaps several months before the general public. But there was no 
clear indication of when these events might have been known to insiders.  
Altogether, eight positive news items were also observed, and these are included in the 
POSNEWS variable. These items included dividend increases by other firms in the industry, a 
favorable Supreme Court ruling, exit by a railroad entrant, and the cessation of intracartel 
conflict (see Appendix).( n18)  
Results  
5.1. 1885-1896  
The first set of results reveal that changes in the prices of Adams and American Express 
stock were systematically related to movements in other markets. Table 1 shows that for 
Adams bond interest rate changes were significant at 0.05; bank clearances were weakly 
significant (0.10), whereas the stock market, though the correct sign, was not significant. 
Neither news variable was statistically significant, and the positive news term was the wrong 
sign.  
The results for American Express (Table 2) showed some notable differences. Movements of 
both interest rates and the stock market were the expected signs and were statistically 
significant (at 0.01). The coefficient for bank clearances, though of the correct sign, was not 
statistically significant. Again, the two news terms -- though both were the correct signs in 
this instance -- were not significant.  
The differences in the results for American and Adams are not surprising. Although both 
firms had ties to the railroads, only American of the two was perceived to carry substantial 
stock market risk that might have been observable through the price changes in railroad 
shares. American's historical dividend record implied that it was less stable as a fixed income 
investment than was Adams. American had reduced its dividend in 1877, a year of particular 
weakness for railroads and the stock market generally. In fact, a modern index of 19th 
century stock prices places the low of the stock market for the entire last quarter of the 
century in June 1877, the exact month that American announced its dividend cut (Moore, 
1961). Investors might then have logically expected that the probability of a dividend 
omission or reduction by American in the future was related to the performance of the 
transportation industry and the market generally. Thus a transportation stock market 
indicator was relatively more important for American than for Adams, the company whose 
dividend did not change even at the market's low. Adams, in contrast, traded like a 
perpetual bond( n19) throughout the period, deemed by the market as likely to keep a 
stable return for the foreseeable future. It could thus have also been expected that changes 
in interest rates would be more important with respect to the price of Adams shares. That 
the stock market variable was not statistically significant suggests that investors did not see 
Adams as facing notable stock market risk.  
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The lack of any apparent relationship of either stock to the news terms suggests that none 
of the events were important enough in the public eye to change public perceptions of the 
firms. Indeed, examination of the data shows very little change in price variance even on the 
days when these news items were announced. Of course, some events (e.g., dividend 
changes by other cartel firms) might have been anticipated and these changes cannot be 
easily captured in monthly averages. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
public reports listed in the Appendix had any appreciable impact on share prices of American 
and Adams express companies. Close inspection of the data reveals no event that led to any 
unusual changes in share returns.  
5.2. Information shock: event study  
However, one key event was studied separately. As noted, in February 1898, Adams revealed 
the true extent of its assets; outside investors learned that the company held highly liquid 
assets -- mostly railroad bonds and stock -- worth substantially more (about 50%) than the 
market value of the company. This event provides a useful benchmark to examine how this 
information affected the stock price and what it suggested about how the price had been 
set previously. The event is especially interesting because even though a dividend of bonds 
was distributed to shareholders, there was really little direct gain to shareholders, and no 
change in either the scope or the activities of the firm. The dividend on the stock had been 
$8 per share of common stock before the bond dividend; afterward, the stock dividend was 
cut in half, while $4 was paid on each ($100 par) bond. Actually, at first only insiders knew 
that the payout would be unchanged. But it can be assumed that if the price of Adams stock 
was determined by insiders, the news overall would have had little impact. Indeed, if all 
inside information was in the price, it may be hypothesized that there should not have been 
a run-up in the combined stock and bond price before or after the information was revealed.  
Admittedly, there was some confusion at first as to whether or not the stock dividend would 
be cut, and the fact that there was heavy volume in February may well indicate insider selling 
(to take advantage of an information asymmetry) to outside investors ignorant of the 
company's plans. But once the company made its policy clear, if the price had previously 
included all known information, it would be expected that the stock would have returned to 
roughly the same relative price and yield it held with respect to the market before February 
10.  
To test whether there was a fundamental change in the market valuation of Adams and 
American express shares as a result of this public revelation, an event study was undertaken. 
Of course, the basic idea of event-study methodology is to measure the abnormal returns 
that result (or do not result) from a particular event. Although there are variations on how 
such studies are conducted, this paper followed a standard approach outlined in Campbell et 
al. (1997): First, a normal return was calculated for a period before the event, designated the 
estimation period. This provided parameters to measure deviations of the actual return from 
predicted values, if they existed, during the event window.  
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To provide the parameters for the event study, a market model regression was run and a 
beta coefficient estimated for Adams and American for a 60-week estimation period -- from 
September 1896 through October 1897. The test used weekly rather than monthly data to 
assess more clearly the immediate impact of the event on the stock price.( n20) The 
equation related the return on a given security i at time, t, to the market return m or:  
( 2) Rit = Alphai + Betai Rmt + Epsiloni  
This test yielded a beta for Adams for the estimation period of 0.185 (significant at 0.01), 
whereas for American the value of beta was 0.110, (significant at 0.05).( n21)  
Second, an event period of 31 weeks -- 15 weeks before and 15 week after the announcement 
week (beginning February 10, 1898) -- was delineated. Using the parameters from the 
estimation period, the abnormal returns for both shares were measured and analyzed. The 
abnormal returns Epsilon* in each period take the form of:  
( 3) Epsilon*, sub i = Ri - Alphai - Betai Rm  
And if indeed there was no real effect on the prices of Adams or American -- as hypothesized 
earlier -- the sum of the abnormal returns should be statistically indistinguishable from zero 
over time.  
Fig. 2 and Table 3 illustrate the abnormal returns for both American and Adams. For Adams 
the break in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at the event week is extreme. As Table 3 
reveals, in the immediate aftermath of the announcement the abnormal return was in fact 
over 0.30. The z-statistic of nearly 6.0 is highly significant at 0.001 (Table 3) and strongly 
rejects the original hypothesis that the abnormal return for the event window is not 
statistically different from zero. The change in the CAR for American Express for the 
immediate announcement period was also significant, albeit at 0.10, implying that the 
market believed in the likelihood that American had been undervalued as well.  
The Adams results were noteworthy in at least two other respects. First, the week before 
the announcement the abnormal return was rather large, with a z-statistic that falls just 
beyond the 0.10 significance level, and can be considered at least marginally significant at 
0.15. This raises the possibility that there was some trading activity by insiders just before 
announcement, which in turn suggests that insiders were aware that the shares were 
undervalued.  
Second, after the announcement, returns fell substantially over the next three trading 
periods, even before it was announced that the dividend would not change. This result 
indicates a possible "overreaction," a phenomenon discussed extensively in the literature 
(e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985).(n22) There was in general a great deal of volatility during 
the three-week period until it was announced that the overall dividend for the stock and 
bond would be the same, at $8, as it had been for the stock alone. On several individual 
11 
 
trading days, price changes were between 0.05 and 0.10. However, statistically, over the last 
two weeks, the standardized average cumulative return (SCAR) is at most marginally 
significant.(n23)  
Still, Fig. 2 shows that the information shock did fundamentally alter share prices of both 
companies (and Adams especially). In later weeks, the abnormal returns for both firms seem 
to have stabilized and, as Table 3 shows, changes were not significantly different from zero. 
But prices were higher, reflecting the one-time revelation of public information.  
As clear as these results are, it must be recalled that the earlier tests showed that Adams 
was more closely tied to the bond market than the stock market. Therefore, the observed 
abnormal return on the stock could have merely reflected some change in the bond market. 
However, as Figs. 3 and 4 show, the yields on Adams and American changed drastically 
relative to bonds as well. Fig. 3 illustrates monthly changes in the yield of Adams relative to 
railroad bonds. In this case, the bond index is the same one that was utilized in the first set 
of regressions.(n24) On February 8, two days before the public announcement, the yield on 
Adams Express shares was 4.79%. By March, after it became clear that Adams was not going 
to pay more than $8 in combined stock-bond dividends, the yield on Adams securities was 
3.9%. In other words, despite the public announcement that the dividend would not 
increase, the yield was 89 basis points lower than it was two days before the announcement 
revealing the company's assets. As the figure shows, on average from January to March 
there was a 116 basis point change! Where previously Adams was priced so that its yield was 
at a premium to railroad bonds, after the announcement the reverse was true and it 
remained true thereafter.  
These data strongly suggest: ( 1) that the market price of Adams in particular reflected a 
premium that outside shareholders demanded to hold Adams in a state of relative 
ignorance; ( 2) that the share prices of the two companies were systematically undervalued 
for a long time; and ( 3) that the revelation of assets represented a piece of vital information 
that fundamentally affected market valuation. If the market had been purely an insider 
market, and the price had carried strong efficiency characteristics, there should have been 
little change in the stock even after the announcement, but that was hardly the case.  
Adams's revelation also affected perceptions of American's fortunes. Although American did 
not raise its dividend, distribute bonds to its shareholders, or even reveal (for the time 
being) the size of its assets, the action by Adams gave American's outside shareholders 
reason to assume that the company was wealthier than anyone previously had thought. 
Note in Fig. 4, its yield relative to railroad bonds fell by 40 basis points in February and 
drifted lower by another 20 points during the ensuing weeks.  
Discussion and conclusion  
The results of this study raise several issues. First, the case adds another datum to the vast 
literature on market efficiency (Fama, 1970, 1991), and more particularly to the studies of 
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efficiency in emerging markets (e.g., Civelek, 1991; Gordon and Rittenberg, 1995). However, 
tests in contemporary emerging markets are often problematic because actual data of firms 
are not reliably known at the time the tests are carried out. This study did not set out to 
prove efficiency, but by using historical data, the study has been able to explore how well 
market valuations reflected all possible facts about two 19th century US companies. Clearly, 
the strongest efficiency arguments must be rejected, because the data suggest that both 
stocks were systematically undervalued because investors lacked relevant information. It is 
not immediately clear whether weaker forms of efficiency are in evidence; the precise 
delineation of efficiency characteristics of these and other historical cases requires further 
investigation.  
The study also raises questions about investor behavior: for example, it may be asked why 
outside shareholders would let themselves be held in ignorance. Or given ignorance, why 
did they invest? But when the context, as well as the return, is taken into account, the 
results are not surprising. This was an emerging equity market where information was 
known to be poor. To invest meant to accept the risk entailed by the lack of information. 
However, investors were compensated for this particular risk. In other words, the price 
reflected what was known and what was not known about the companies.(n25) 
Shareholders can be said to have accepted the greater risk of no information on assets or 
earnings by receiving a high return, which historically proved better than they would have 
received on a seemingly safer (or at least better understood) alternative such as railway 
bonds.  
The study also leads to speculation as to motivation of insiders: why were they willing to let 
the market clearly undervalue the stock they held? But this, too, has a plausible explanation. 
As Grossman (1992) argues, insiders believed that by keeping the public generally, and the 
railroads particularly, ignorant, they gave their companies advantages in setting contract 
terms with railroads and thus made their firms ultimately more profitable. Insiders also knew 
if they liquidated their firms, they would be able to realize the value they knew existed. Of 
course, this meant that if they sold shares before liquidation, they would have failed to gain 
some of that value. But anecdotal evidence suggests most insiders were individuals who had 
long-term commitments to the companies in question (Grossman, 1987).  
Finally, this study of express shares also tells us something about how pricing takes place 
over time in emerging markets. It seems clear that many of today's investors in emerging 
markets (particularly foreign investors) have used the same kind of historical and proxy data 
used by their 19th century counterparts to determine purchases of emerging market equity 
issues (Espana, 1995). These issues, like express shares, have also yielded above-average 
returns (at times), but clearly also have carried significant risks in part because so little about 
them has been known. It seems that the promise of high returns but the problem of poor 
information has been driving recent investment decisions in markets such as those of Russia 
and China.  
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The example of the express shares also shows how risks and returns can change over time. 
First, investors may find that long-term historical data about how a company's shares 
perform relative to various markets and the economy as a whole can provide a basis for 
estimating a return and a level of risk. Second, data often improve over time for many 
reasons, legal reporting (as in this case) being but one of them. There are certainly many 
reasons generally for emerging markets to strive for improvement in the quality of 
information. Firms that want to attract more outside investment benefit as a rule through 
more and better information; alternatively, when incentives remain for firms to restrict 
information, they can continue to compensate outside shareholders for the added risk of 
ignorance. Either way emerging economies can continue to attract investment and offer 
viable markets for company shares.  
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Notes  
(n1.) There are a number of works that treat the evolution of U.S. equity markets. For example, 
see Davis and Cull (1994).  
(n2.) Railroads issued reports as often as every month. These were carried in the financial press. 
Indeed, the reports of major railroads typically appeared on the front page of The Wall Street 
Journal.  
(n3.) The express lost control of the parcel post in 1913, when the Post Office Department was 
finally permitted to offer a package delivery system.  
(n4.) The three other major express firms were not included in the study for specific reasons. 
The Southern Express was closely held and did not trade. United States Express (called the 
"States") was operated by the family of Thomas C. Platt who, while president of the States, 
was also a sitting United States Senator. Thus political factors might have impacted the price 
movements of its shares; these effects would have been difficult to determine. Wells Fargo was 
not included because it, unlike Adams and American, had a limited liability charter. Although 
the special charter permitted the firm to withhold some information, it was required to hold 
annual shareholder meetings. Shareholders were able possibly to glean somewhat more 
information about it as a result. Also, after 1887, due to a federal government inquiry into 
railroad practices in the west, it became known that the Central Pacific and Southern Pacific 
railroads held a controlling block of Wells Fargo shares. (See transcripts of the U.S. Pacific 
Railway Commission hearings, August 10, 1887.)  
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(n5.) Four of the five major express firms started as New York-chartered joint stock companies. 
Wells Fargo received a very favorable limited liability charter from the Colorado territory and 
incorporated in 1866; the Southern was chartered at the direction of the Georgia Supreme 
Court in 1861. Adams, American Express, and United States Express companies retained their 
New York unlimited liability charters throughout the 19th century (Grossman, 1992).  
(n6.) Noted in the "Minutes of the Executive Committee of the American Express Company," 
February 3, 1876, American Express (hereafter, AE) archives.  
(n7.) For example, in some years, in the Minutes of the Board of Directors at American Express, 
statements of earnings are blank; in other years, earnings simply are not mentioned in the 
record. Only the five members of the Executive Committee at American Express appear to have 
known, on a quarterly or annual basis, the extent of the company's profits. There was one 
report given to the board in 1888 showing 10-year net earnings of $26.24 million. It is the only 
contemporaneous long-run earnings report in the record (AE Archives).  
(n8.) Annual volume for the previous year was published each January in the New York Times 
from the mid-1890s onward for all NYSE stocks. Turnover of the shares of both express 
companies was in the range of 10 to 20% or 1000 to 3000 shares per month. Daily trade data 
beginning in the 1880s reveal that generally express shares traded a few times per week in 
varying lot sizes from a few shares to several hundred.  
(n9.) There is, of course, a literature on the influence of less-than-fully informed, or "noisy," 
shareholders on market behavior (e.g., Black, 1986). But this case is unusual because of the 
degree to which outside shareholders were without access to basic information and because 
insiders permitted shares to be undervalued over the long term.  
(n10.) The firms reported that they owned physical capital worth a little over $5 million. They 
did not report that they owned stock and bond portfolios worth tens of millions of dollars.  
(n11.) This was true for Adams and American. As noted, Wells Fargo was controlled by railroad 
interests.  
(n12.) In the early history of the express industry, entry was relatively easy and hundreds of 
express firms were created. But as Grossman (1996) explains, later there were formidable 
barriers to entry, and the cartel was largely successful in blocking all attempts. Still, known 
entry attempts could have been considered costly to the firms by outside shareholders.  
(n13.) There were "common routes." That is, there were often different railroads (and express 
companies serving them) that could travel between two large cities exclusively over their own 
lines. For example, three railroads, and three different express companies, could get to Chicago 
from New York without changing lines. Express firms could have competed with one another 
over these routes, but they tended to cooperate instead. But if a railroad took over one of 
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these lines, the express firms could have engaged the rail line in a price war. See Grossman 
(1996).  
(n14.) Adams explained that they were taking this step because of "attacks to which the 
company has been subjected at the hands of the Tax Commissioners of various states." 
Reported in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 12, 1898 (p. 339).  
(n15.) The Dow was, at the start of the series, actually comprised of fourteen stocks including 
the following railroads: New York Central; Central of New Jersey; Central Pacific; Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul; Chicago & North Western; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western; Delaware & 
Hudson Canal; Lake Shore; Louisville & Nashville; Missouri Pacific; Northern Pacific (preferred); 
and Union Pacific. Western Union and the Pacific Mail Steamship completed the list. In early 
1886, the Central of New Jersey and the Central Pacific were dropped. The index was modified 
somewhat again in 1894, although the basic balance of rail and nonrail companies stayed the 
same (Stillman, 1986).  
(n16.) It should be noted that Bank Clearances were not strongly correlated with either the 
stock or bond markets.  
(n17.) Further analysis included running these same basic regressions with other railroad 
industry proxies, including price movements of shares in railroad companies with known ties to 
Adams or American. Movements of these share prices had much lower correlations with bond 
interest rates. Basically, these proxies led to the same basic results as those found using the 
Dow.  
(n18.) To see whether these public reports were anticipated, the regressions were run with 
news terms a month early. No statistically significant relationships were observed.  
(n19.) Adams offered a yield that was quite similar to that offered on railroad consols. A survey 
of such bonds in the July 14, 1891 issue of the Wall Street Journal quoted yields ranging from 
5.18% to 6.45%. At that time, the yield on Adams Express stock was 5.45%.  
(n20.) This test utilized weekly average returns for a trading week defined by trades from 
Friday to Thursday. The week was construed in this way because the announcement day of the 
event was a Friday. By using a Friday-to-Thursday week, the data captures trading up to the day 
before the announcement as well as the week immediately after the announcement. The test 
was also run using daily data, but although the shares traded every week, on average they 
traded only two or three times per week, making weekly data more tractable for statistical 
analysis.  
(n21.) Results (S.E. in parentheses):  
Adams: R = 0.000751 + 0.184963*Rm  
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(0.00135) (0.052831) AR2 = 0.154  
American: R = 0.001021 + 0.11015*Rm  
(0.00121) (0.047855) AR2 = 0.065  
(n22.) Indeed, the impression of an overreaction is strengthened by the fact that the largest 
drop (of about 0.10) came on a single day, the third trading day after the announcement.  
(n23.) Again, significant at only 0.15.  
(n24.) Average monthly changes are used here because only a monthly bond index was 
available. However, Adams's yield was measured against yields of some representative bond 
issues; basically weekly data confirm the picture of Fig. 3.  
(n25.) The reputation of managers might also have been a factor in determining investor 
behavior. Anecdotal evidence, however, does not clarify this issue. The managers were 
generally secretive men, who shunned the limelight. The most public individual during the 
period was John Hoey, President of Adams, whose ostentatious lifestyle earned him some 
negative publicity (Harlow, 1937). One might expect this to have reduced investment in 
Adams but there is no evidence that it did.  
Table 1 Adams Express and share price factors February 1885-May 1896  
 
Legend for Chart: 
 
A - Variable 
B - Coefficient 
 
   A                         B 
 
CONSTANT                  0.000609 
                         (0.00139) 
 
Delta BANK-1        0.045790[*] 
                         (0.02718) 
 
Delta BOND               -0.418720[**] 
                         (0.17008) 
 
Delta DOW                 0.061030 
                         (0.05049) 
 
NEGNEWS                  -0.003430 
                         (0.00414) 
 
POSNEWS                  -0.004020 
                         (0.00535) 
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Adj R2 = 0.13 
D - W = 2.12 
 
[*] Significant at 0.10. 
[**] Significant at 0.05. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 American Express and share price factors February 1885-May 1896  
 
Legend for Chart: 
 
A - Variable 
B - Coefficient 
 
   A                         B 
 
CONSTANT                  0.000818 
                         (0.00123) 
 
Delta BANK-1        0.023953 
                         (0.02395) 
 
Delta BOND               -0.496960[*] 
                         (0.14988) 
 
Delta DOW                 0.145172[*] 
                         (0.04448) 
 
NEGNEWS                  -0.003580 
                         (0.00365) 
 
POSNEWS                   0.004644 
                         (0.00472) 
 
Adj R2 = 0.30 
D - W = 2.14 
 
[*] Significant at 0.01. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 3 Abnormal returns for the 31-week event period  
 
Legend for Chart: 
 
A - Week 
B - Adams Express Epsilon[*] 
C - Adams Express z-Statistic 
D - Adams Express CAR 
E - American Express Epsilon[*] 
F - American Express z-Statistic 
G - American Express CAR 
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A             B               C                 D 
              E               F                 G 
 
-15        0.00121         0.02298           0.00121 
           0.00815         0.17033           0.00815 
 
-14       -0.02421        -0.45850          -0.02300 
          -0.00270        -0.05647           0.00545 
 
-13       -0.00579        -0.10962          -0.02879 
           0.00565         0.11808           0.01110 
 
-12       -0.00360        -0.06810          -0.03239 
          -0.00219        -0.04569           0.00891 
 
-11        0.01643         0.31109          -0.01596 
          -0.00125        -0.02605           0.00766 
 
-10       -0.01054        -0.19966          -0.02650 
          -0.01155        -0.24128          -0.00388 
 
-9         0.00040         0.00755          -0.02610 
          -0.00543        -0.11347          -0.00931 
 
-8         0.00350         0.06635          -0.02260 
           0.00082         0.01711          -0.00849 
 
-7         0.00876         0.16590          -0.01384 
          -0.00112        -0.02347          -0.00961 
 
-6         0.00217        -0.04107          -0.01601 
           0.00161         0.03369          -0.00800 
 
-5        -0.00491        -0.09289          -0.02091 
           0.01298         0.27120           0.00498 
 
-4         0.00876         0.16591          -0.01215 
          -0.00097        -0.02024           0.00401 
 
-3        -0.00777         0.14714          -0.01992 
          -0.00403        -0.08420          -0.00002 
 
-2         0.00662        -0.12527          -0.01330 
           0.00037         0.00776           0.00035 
 
-1         0.06670         1.26295           0.05339 
           0.00107         0.02240           0.00142 
 
0[a]       0.30713         5.81587[**]       0.36052 
           0.07058         1.47507[*]        0.07200 
 
1         -0.00823        -0.15590           0.35229 
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          -0.00990        -0.20689           0.06210 
 
2         -0.06027        -1.14117           0.29202 
           0.01456         0.30437           0.07666 
 
3         -0.02783        -0.52706           0.26419 
          -0.01374         0.28718           0.06292 
 
4         -0.00022        -0.00413           0.26497 
          -0.00826        -0.17270           0.05466 
 
5          0.00155         0.02936           0.26552 
           0.02240         0.46805           0.07706 
 
6         -0.00675        -0.12789           0.25877 
           0.02226        -0.46524           0.05480 
 
7          0.00102         0.01929           0.25979 
          -0.02192        -0.04580           0.03288 
 
8         -0.00033        -0.00624           0.25946 
           0.02747         0.57421           0.06034 
 
9         -0.00018        -0.00349           0.25927 
          -0.04331        -0.90517           0.01703 
 
10        -0.01045        -0.19792           0.24882 
           0.01865         0.38988           0.03568 
 
11         0.00591         0.11184           0.25473 
          -0.00384        -0.08029           0.03184 
 
12        -0.01882        -0.35646           0.23590 
           0.02792         0.58351           0.05976 
 
13        -0.00040        -0.00764           0.23550 
          -0.00473        -0.09889           0.05503 
 
14        -0.00618        -0.11704           0.22932 
           0.01148         0.23990           0.06651 
 
15         0.00311         0.05902           0.23243 
           0.00605         0.12648           0.07256 
 
[a] Event week. 
 
[*] Significant at 0.10. 
 
[**] Significant at 0.001. 
GRAPH: Fig. 1. Cumulative Wealth-American, Adams, Railroad Bonds  
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GRAPH: Fig. 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Adams  
GRAPH: Fig. 3. Premium on Adams Express Yield Versus Bonds  
GRAPH: Fig. 4. Premium on American Express Yield Versus Bonds  
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Appendix Publicly reported events faced by the express industry 1885-1896  
 
Negative 
 
Entry attempt                     May 1886 
Intra-cartel conflict             June 1886 
Resumption of conflict            Dec 1886 
Further conflict                  Jan-Mar 1887 
Pacific railway hearings          Aug. 1887 
Cartel conflict                   Sept. 1887 
Cartel conflict                   Nov. 1887 
Price warfare                     Jan. 1888 
Cartel conflict                   May 1888 
Cartel conflict                   March 1890 
US Express div. cut               June 1890 
US Express div. cut               June 1891 
Wells Fargo div. cut              June 1894 
US Express div. cut               June 1895 
Wells Fargo div. cut              Oct. 1895 
 
Positive 
 
Supreme Court ruling              Oct. 1886 
Temporary halt to conflict        Nov. 1886 
Entrant fails                     Aug. 1888 
End of cartel conflict            Feb. 1889 
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US Express div. increase          June 1889 
Cartel rate agreement             Oct. 1890 
US Express div. increase          June 1891 
US Express div. increase          May 1896 
 
